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In this so-called “information age,” when numerous
companies are collecting and creating more and more data and
information, it is important to consider how the interests of these
companies can (and should) be reconciled with the public’s
interests in information, or what the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights labels the “right to information.” Having expended
money to create their stores of information, these companies often
claim the need to protect it from all “unauthorized” uses, but our
laws have never gone so far. To the contrary, information is not
protected unless the law says it is, and when it is protected the
scope of protection is usually limited. Thus, there is an information
dichotomy that courts should consider; on one hand various laws
seek to protect certain types of information, while other laws and
legal principles are designed to promote the expression and
diffusion of information.
Sometimes the information dichotomy is reflected in the laws
themselves which often limit the scope of protectable information
and explicitly allow certain uses of information. Other times, or in
addition, the dichotomy is reflected in the application of ancillary
principles of law which, in effect, serve as additional limitations on
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the scope of protection. This article examines the information
dichotomy of trade secret law in the United States and the
European Union, focusing on two ancillary principles of law:
freedom of expression and whistleblowing. The central premise of
the article is that the public policy favoring information diffusion is
the rule and trade secret protection is an exception. Seen through
this prism, it is important for courts to consider the public’s
interest in free expression and whistleblowing in all trade secret
cases.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
There is an information dichotomy that exists in law,
particularly with respect to trade secret laws, including the
European Union’s (E.U.) directive on the protection of undisclosed
know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their
unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (the “Trade Secret
Directive”). 1 The dichotomy is between: (1) the strong public
policy in the United States (U.S.), the E.U., and elsewhere that
favors and encourages the creation and dissemination of
information and knowledge; and (2) laws, such as the Trade Secret
Directive, that enable individuals and businesses to protect certain
categories of information from acquisition, use, or disclosure by
others. As with intellectual property (IP) laws more generally, the
theory underlying trade secret protection is that society gets
something that is of greater benefit than the advantages that flow
from information diffusion and free competition. In the case of
trade secrets, this includes the prevention of unfair competition and
additional incentives for invention and creation over and above
what is provided by patent and copyright laws.
Much has been written about trade secret law and policy from
the protection side of the information dichotomy, with those who
favor strong trade secret protection touting the economic benefits
that they believe follow from the protection of trade secrets. Much
less has been written about the information diffusion side of the
dichotomy, 2 particularly as it relates to the human right (and need)
1
Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information
(trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J.
(L 157) 1 [hereinafter “Trade Secret Directive”].
2
Previous works that have explored the tension between trade secret law and
the U.S. First Amendment include: Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving
Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
777 (2007) and Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age: The
Battle Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 517 (2002),
which heavily relied upon and cited Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the
Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV.
LITIG. 317 (1999). For an examination of freedom of expression issues with
respect to other types of information law, see, e.g, Tun-Jen Chiang, Patents and
Free Speech, 107 GEO. L.J. 309, 311 (2019); Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First
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to “seek, receive and impart information.” 3 Yet information law
principles in both the U.S. and E.U. are replete with statements of
the critical role that information diffusion plays in the
advancement of important social values, including democracy,
innovation, and creativity. With respect to innovation, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor explained that “[t]he efficient operation of
the [U.S.] federal patent system depends upon substantially free
trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian
conceptions.” 4
Trade secret law is not insensitive to information diffusion
concerns; both the U.S. and the E.U. have adopted rather similar
limitations to trade secret protection that are designed to strike a
balance between information protection and information diffusion.
Additionally, in the Trade Secret Directive, the whistleblowing
provision enables disclosures 5 that serve the public interest,
including revealing illegal activities and misconduct. 6 Moreover,
the Directive’s provision concerning freedom of speech safeguards
Amendment, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 197 (2018); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008);
Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 135, 138 (2004); Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing
Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139
(2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999);
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volkh, Freedom of Speech and Injunction in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
3
See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.”) (emphasis added).
4
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
5
A word about the use of the word “disclosure” when talking about trade
secrets: The word “disclosure” in the trade secret context can have multiple
meanings and effects, one of which is the act of making information known in a
way that results in the loss of trade secrecy. Another is a synonym for sharing
information, which does not necessarily result in the loss of trade secrecy.
Unless otherwise indicated, we use the word “disclosure” throughout this article
to mean the act of sharing information without making any claim as to the legal
effect of such disclosure.
6
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Art. 5 (b).
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media freedom and plurality in accordance with the E.U. Charter
of Fundamental Rights (Charter). 7 Quite similarly to the E.U., the
U.S. has adopted a whistleblowing provision as part of the Defend
Trade Secret Act of 2016 (DTSA) which, together with the U.S.
Constitution, protects freedom of expression with impacts on trade
secret protection in some contexts. However, what is missing from
both U.S. law as expressed in the DTSA (and its state-analogue the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)) and E.U. law as expressed in
the Trade Secret Directive is a clear statement of the purposes
behind such limitations and exceptions and an explanation of how
they are to be applied. Absent legislative direction, these are
matters for courts to consider.
The main objective of this article is to explore how the freedom
of expression and whistleblower provisions of E.U. and U.S. law
should be applied to further the right to information in the trade
secret context, demonstrating the similarities and differences in
E.U. and U.S. approaches in the process. It begins in Part II with a
brief discussion of trade secret law and how E.U. and U.S. trade
secret doctrine, when properly applied, promote information
diffusion and reduce potential conflicts between the desire to
protect trade secrets and the public’s interest in information. Next,
Part III explains the right to information as expressed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the legal
principles of the E.U. and U.S., including the values and interests
that underlie such right.
Finally, Parts IV and V get to the heart of the analysis by
examining the meaning and application of the right to information
in two contexts that are addressed in both U.S. and E.U. trade
secret law: freedom of expression and whistleblowing,
respectively. Among other things, it explains how conflicts
7
See id. Art. 5 (a). The Charter belongs to the E.U.’s primary law having the
same legal value as the E.U. Treaties. However, the Charter does not extend the
competences of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13. For case law on the applicability of the
Charter to E.U. Member State laws and measures, see in particular Case C617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62010CJ0617 (Feb. 26, 2013).

6
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between trade secret protection and the right to information can
arise and identifies circumstances that should favor information
diffusion over information lock-down; an inquiry that is becoming
of greater importance as more and more information is digitized
and put behind paywalls. The article concludes by summarizing the
similarities and differences between E.U. and U.S. approaches to
freedom of expression and whistleblowing, issues that are of great
importance for democratic societies.
In the E.U., the Trade Secret Directive’s national
implementation period ended in summer 2018, whilst the
Whistleblower Directive’s implementation period has not yet
ended. Consequently, there is no case law on the interpretation of
these specific provisions. Similarly, while the DTSA went into
effect immediately when it was signed by President Obama on
May 11, 2016, there is no significant post-DTSA case law on the
topic of this article. Nonetheless, this article proposes how these
provisions should be interpreted when taking into account the
relevant human rights doctrine and explains how and why such an
interpretation would differ from the interpretation that the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has favored under the
E.U.’s copyright regime. The discussion that follows not only
covers the explicit rules under the trade secret laws, it also
provides an outline of how these principles have been developed
under applicable constitutional law doctrine.
II.

THE LIMITATIONS BUILT INTO U.S. AND E.U. TRADE
SECRET LAW
While trade secret principles have developed and evolved over
decades, 8 trade secret law in the E.U. and the U.S. is now primarily
reflected in two sets of largely uniform and harmonized laws. In
the U.S., this law is set forth in both the UTSA, 9 which has now

See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33
HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010).
9
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. § 539–40 (1980) and 14 U.L.A. § 433
(1985) [hereinafter the “UTSA”].
8
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been adopted by 48 states, and the DTSA, 10 which created a federal
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation that is
modeled after the UTSA. In the E.U., the governing law is the
Trade Secret Directive, which has been adopted by and is now
reflected in the written laws of most E.U.-member states. 11 As with
intellectual property laws, the theory underlying trade secret
protection is that society gets something that is of greater benefit
than the advantages that flow from information diffusion and free
competition. In the case of trade secrets, this includes the
prevention of unfair competition and additional incentives for
invention and creation over and above what is provided by patent
and copyright laws.
Importantly, for information diffusion, freedom of expression,
and whistleblowing purposes, none of the cited laws protect all
business information, or even all confidential information. Rather,
U.S. and E.U. trade secret law only protect information that meets
the three requirements of trade secrecy; namely, information that
(1) is not generally known or readily ascertainable (accessible); (2)
derives economic (commercial) value from not being known to
others; and (3) has been the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 12 Thus, no trade
secret misappropriation claim can prevail for information that is
already available to the public at the time of the alleged
misappropriation and few, if any, conflicts with free expression
should arise.
For information that does not meet the definition of a trade
secret, the overarching principle is that the information should be
free to acquire, disclose, and use by the public, the press, and
whistleblowers alike, provided that some other law or legal

Pub.L. 114–53, 130 Stat. 376 (enacted May 11, 2016, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1836, et seq.) [hereinafter the “DTSA”].
11
Although all E.U.-member states were required to conform their laws to the
Trade Secret Directive by the transposition date of June, 9, 2018, according to
Eur-Lex 32016L0943, as of the date of the publication of this article, some E.U.member state have yet to fully comply with the Directive.
12
See UTSA, supra note 9, at § 1(4); DTSA, supra note 10, at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1839(3); Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Art. 2(1).
10
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principle does not constrict such usage. 13 Moreover, even where
some theory of protection for information (including trade secrecy)
exists, other explicit and ancillary limitations, including those that
are the focus of the remainder of this article, often apply to require
that the desire to protect information be balanced against other
interests. For instance, in both the E.U. and U.S., preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief ordinarily will not be granted without
consideration of the public interest 14 which is considered in
conjunction with a request for a protective order. 15
Although all of the limitations and exceptions to trade secret
protection are also designed to preserve free competition and
employee mobility, because we believe the rights of listeners and
receivers of information are also at stake in many trade secret
cases, we contend that more consideration should be given to
whether a third party (including government regulators and the
public) has an interest in the putative trade secrets. By paying more
attention to the human right to information, the trade secret
misappropriation analysis should not assume that the protection of
information is a positive without: (1) first making certain that the
information qualifies as trade secrets; and (2) carefully considering
if the protection of those trade secrets in specific factual contexts
will unduly interfere with the public’s and the press’ fundamental
right to information.

13
In both the E.U. and the U.S., there are laws, in addition to the trade secret
laws, that may prohibit the use or disclosure of specified information in certain
settings. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the
E.U. and the federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, in the U.S., but often
a need to balance information protection against the public interest arises in
those settings as well.
14
In the U.S., see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. In the E.U., see Trade Secret Directive,
supra note 1, 2. See also, Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free
Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009)
(detailing how and when First Amendment issues typically arise in trade secret
litigation in the U.S. and the standards for the grant of preliminary injunctions).
15
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Art. 9
(setting rules for Preservation of confidentiality of trade secrets in the course of
legal proceedings).
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III.
THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHT TO
INFORMATION AND ITS OPERATION IN THE U.S. AND E.U.
An ancillary principle of law that exists and that we contend
must be considered in trade secret cases is the human right to
information that is reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the legal principles of the E.U. and U.S.,
including the values and interests that underlie such right.
Obviously, this right is strongest when the subject information is
already available to the public because to restrict access to such
information risks removing it from the public sphere. But we also
believe that the human right to information can be implicated in
cases involving legitimate trade secrets and other confidential
information. The reason for our concern is simple: humans need
information to be productive, innovative, and engaged members of
their communities and the more information that is effectively
locked-down, the less the public will be informed.
Humans have a long history of seeking, receiving, and
imparting information, hampered only by the availability of
information, the means to record and convey it, and laws and
norms that restrict its dissemination. While by no means a linear
progression, the history of humankind includes numerous
technological advances that have improved its ability to create,
collect, and share information, thereby increasing the store of
information and improving and expanding the availability and
distribution of information. Law and government institutions have
played central roles in this history, sometimes limiting the creation
and distribution of information in unfortunate and troubling ways,
but more often by encouraging and promoting the creation and
distribution of information. The public’s interest in the
dissemination of information was particularly acute in the
aftermath of WWII when “the practices of European fascism
fueled the reaction against library censorship” 16 and a lack of
government transparency. 17 Thus, it is not surprising that when the
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 238 (2003) (citing M.
HARRIS, HISTORY OF LIBRARIES IN THE WESTERN WORLD 248 (4th ed. 1995)).
17
Infra note 22.
16
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delegates gathered after World War II to draft the UDHR,
provisions were included that addressed the human need for
information and learning. 18
Unfortunately, while the principles of freedom of speech and
press (collectively, freedom of expression) are well known, the
right to information is not; 19 but you cannot have freedom of
expression without some information to impart. As one
commentator explained:
[The] relationship [between freedom of expression and information] is
contiguous and complicated; logical and paradoxical. It is characterized
by mutual dependencies . . . . [I]nformation can be seen as antecedent
to expression. However, expression can also produce and disseminate
information, which suggests a more complex and symbiotic
relationship. 20

It follows then that the same theoretical justifications for the
protection of freedom of expression apply to the right to
information. These rationales include: “self-fulfillment/individual
autonomy; the advancement of knowledge/discovery of
truth/avoidance of error; effective participation in democratic
society; self-government; distrust of government/slippery slope
arguments.” 21 Other justifications, particularly with respect to
information held by governments, include: the instrumental
justification noted above (namely, that free expression cannot
occur without information); a proprietary justification that
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19; See also Communications
Concerning Freedom of Information and Freedom of the Press (United States
Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations) (April 23, 1946),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/HR/2
[https://perma.cc/XAW4-5Y6P].
19
See TARLACH MCGONAGLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION WITHIN THE UN: LEAPS AND BOUNDS OR FITS
AND STARTS?, IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
INFORMATION (McGonagle & Donders eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015)
(discussing the right to information under international law); Easton, supra note
2, at 139 (discussing the “right to know” under U.S. law and the applicable
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court).
20
McGonagle, supra note 19, at 5.
21
Id.; see also, Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against
Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 940 (2009) (setting forth the
traditional justifications for freedom of expression).
18

MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information

11

government information belongs to the public; and a government
oversight justification. 22
In the pantheon of human rights, at least as expressed in
international agreements, the right to information is a relative
newcomer. 23 This is likely because there is often no need to
affirmatively express and protect a right until it is restricted in
some manner and because, before the invention of the printing
press and the wide-spread availability of printed information, the
quest for information and knowledge was more individualistic.
However, the right to information has antecedents in the Swedish
Freedom of Printing Press Act of 1766 (which was written by a
Finn, Anders Chydenius) and in 18th Century administrative codes
and government practices. 24 More recently, it was the difficulty of
the press and media to gain access to information about various
aspects of World War II that led members of the U.S. delegation,
among others, to advocate for the inclusion of Article 19 in the
UDHR and for a special United Nations Conference on Freedom of
Information, which was convened in Geneva, Switzerland in the
spring of 1948. 25 The work at this conference ultimately led to
Article 19 of the ICCPR. 26
ICCPR, Article 19 has 3 parts, which read:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas

22
Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right to Information, 42
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 365–68 (2011).
23
See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 238 (2003) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (providing a history of public libraries in the U.S. and noting that
the events of World War II prompted greater calls for “freedom of access” to the
printed word).
24
HELEN DARBISHIRE, TEN CHALLENGES FOR THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION IN
THE AGE OF MEGA-LEAKS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND INFORMATION (McGonagle & Donders eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015)
(providing an overview of the history of the right to information and noting that
it was a product of enlightenment thinking).
25
G.A. Res. 59 (I), at 95 (Dec. 14, 1946).
26
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 52
(Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter the ICCPR].
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of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or
reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. (Emphasis
added.) 27

A. The Right to Information in the E.U.
All E.U. Member States have ratified the ICCPR. 28
Consequently, freedom of expression, including an explicit right to
information, is a human right that all E.U. Member States are
bound to recognize, with only the limited exceptions that are
allowed pursuant to the italicized portions of ICCPR Article 19.3,
above. Additionally, these same rights are enshrined in the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Article 10, 29
thereby giving the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
jurisdiction to enforce the right to information.
Significantly, Article 19 of the ICCPR first expresses the rights
and then sets forth some limitations; rights that we contend should
serve as a direct counterbalance to the protection of trade secrets
and other confidential information. While the limitations that are
contained in Article 19.3 help define when it is appropriate to favor
Id., Art. 19.
See STATUS OF RATIFICATION INTERACTIVE DASHBOARD, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS:
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
https://indicators.ohchr.org/. [https://perma.cc/4FYU-G4F9].
29
The ECHR came in force in Finland in 23th of May 1990 through Act
18.5.1990/439 (SopS 19/1990). The ECHR is not a legislative instrument of the
E.U. and it has as its Members also non-E.U. Member States. However, all E.U.
Member States are also Members to the ECHR and Article 52(3) of the Charter
links the interpretation of the Charter provisions to the ECHR. Article 52(3) of
the Charter provides: “In so far as this Convention contains rights which
correspond to the rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and the scope of those
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” In
this article, the application area for the ECHR will be referred to as Europe and
the application area for the Charter will be referred to as the E.U.
27
28
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trade secret protection over the right to information, they do not
suggest that the right to information should be ignored if the listed
circumstances appear to be applicable. Rather, Article 19.3 directs
that the necessity for any limitations on the right to information
must be fully considered.
The ECHR is very similarly worded with the ICCPR. Article
10 of the ECHR provides: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 30 Gathering
information and access to information has been highlighted by the
ECtHR as an important preliminary part of the protection of press
freedoms. Therefore, in Europe, there has to be effective
enforcement mechanisms available to ensure press access to public
documents. If a journalist’s intention is to impart relevant
information of public concern to the public and contribute to the
public debate, but access to information is denied, the right to
impart information is violated. 31
Even though earlier interpretation of the ECHR did not
recognize a separate right to access information, the ECtHR has
broadened its interpretation so that the right to receive information
now also includes the right to access information and government
documents in some situations. This expanded right is given not
only to journalists, but also to non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), which likewise serve a watchdog role in society. 32
Similarly, the ECtHR extended the right of access to researchers in
a case where access to original documents concerning the
Article 10 will be discussed in a more detailed manner, including the
justified limitations to freedom of expression, in Part III.
31
Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 27329/06.
32
Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
48135/06; Erhaltung v. Austria, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 39534/07. The
approach where the access right is only given to a specific type of groups,
having watchdog role, has been criticized from the perspective that at present
also others than press and similar type of groups can initiate public discourse on
matters of general interest through use of social media. See LORNA WOODS,
DIGITAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE EU, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397 (Sionaidh Douglas-Scott & Nicolas Hatzis eds.,
2017).
30
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Hungarian secret service was sought for legitimate historical
research, finding that such access was part of the historian’s
freedom of expression. 33 It is also noteworthy that the Charter
provides in Article 42 for a right of access to E.U. Parliament,
Council, and Commission documents. This right belongs to E.U.
citizens and residents, including also legal entities having a
registered office in any E.U. Member State. 34 Yet, the access right
is not an absolute one, as occasionally there might be legitimate
reasons to limit the right to information. 35
B. The Right to Information in the U.S.
In the U.S., the source of the right to information is more
difficult to see and understand, in part, because it is an ancillary (or
penumbral) aspect of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution’s prohibition on government restrictions on free
speech and freedom of the press, 36 but also because state
constitutions, the common law, and both federal and state laws
must be considered. The source and scope of the right to
information in the U.S. is also obscured by the fact that neither the
UDHR or the ICCPR 37 are self-executing in the U.S., meaning that
they are not themselves binding law in the U.S. but only a
“statement of principles” with “moral authority.” 38 As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:
But the [UDHR] does not of its own force impose obligations as a
matter of international law . . . . And, although the [ICCPR] does bind
Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. no. 31475/05.
This right is also recognized under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L145)
43; and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 15.3., 2003 O.J.
(C 115) 54, 55.
35
DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – A
HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS 17 (2017) (explaining Matky v. Czech
Republic, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 19101/03).
36
See Easton, supra note 2.
37
Although the ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on 19 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976, the United States
did not ratify the ICCPR (with reservations) until September 8, 1992.
38
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
33
34
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the United States as a matter of international law, the United States
ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it was not selfexecuting and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the
[US] federal courts. 39

Further complicating an understanding of the right to
information in the U.S. is the confusing, multi-layered, and highly
contextual jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning
such right. 40 Moreover, the U.S. and each of the fifty individual
states have adopted freedom of information laws which are
generally designed to assure that both the public and the press have
access to government-held information, but with variations and
exceptions, including the so-called “trade secret exception.” 41
The seeds of a U.S. constitutional right to information first
began to be recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1923 in
Meyer v. Nebraska 42 and was reaffirmed in 1943 in Martin v. City
of Struthers when the Court explained the instrumental nature of
the right:
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors
of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas
might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom
which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to
triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to
distribute literature, . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it. 43
Id. at 734–35.
See, David L. Hudson, Jr., Right to Receive Information, 10 U. ST. THOMAS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2010); 74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006); Jamie Kennedy,
The Right to Receive Information: The Current State of the Doctrine and The
Best Application for the Future, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 789 (2005); Barry P.
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards A
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
249 (2004); Easton, supra note 2.
41
Under the federal Freedom of Information Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(2018).
42
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (finding a state statute which
forbade any teaching except in English unconstitutional).
43
Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
39
40
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From this, it has long been recognized that the First
Amendment protects both the speaker and the listener from
inappropriate government restrictions on speech and the press,
which in trade secret cases can come in the form of injunctive
relief. 44 This includes the “important corollary right” to receive
information and ideas. 45 What is less clear, and more limited under
U.S. jurisprudence, is another arguably corollary right: the right to
collect and access information. 46 The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted the special role of information gathering, particularly by the
press, in ensuring the benefits of the First Amendment. 47 Thus,
given a specific restriction and a particular context, a right of
access to information has been recognized in some cases. 48 For
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the
FCC.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen. of U. S., 381 U.S. 301, 307–08 (1965) (concurrence of Brennan and
Goldberg) (“It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of
access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes
beyond the specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgment those
equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees
fully meaningful.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
44
See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2018), citing e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (noting that “private
speech prohibitions can still implicate the First Amendment when given the
imprimatur of state protection through civil or criminal law”).
45
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972) (citing cases); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867
(1982).
46
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726–28 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (“A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news.
The full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee
would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the
process by which news is assembled and disseminated.”).
47
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“[W]ithout some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); First
National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (“The First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw.”).
48
See, e.g., Fusaro v. Logan, 930 F. 3d 241, 253 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that
“the Supreme Court has strongly signaled that certain types of conditions on
access to government information may be subject to First Amendment
scrutiny”).
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instance, there is rich jurisprudence that recognizes the right of
individuals and the press to access information concerning criminal
proceedings. 49 This right has been extended by various courts to
civil trials and various administrative proceedings. 50 Additionally,
in cases that have challenged restrictions placed on libraries, the
courts have noted the need of library patrons to have access to a
diversity of information. 51
Despite the obvious and practical connection between the
ability to gather and access information and free expression, the
constitutional right to gather and access information in the U.S. is
limited. However, a statutory right to access information may exist
at both the state and federal levels, particularly pursuant to socalled “freedom of information acts” and “sunshine laws.” In this
regard, while the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that there is, at
best, a limited constitutional or common law right to access certain
government information (the right of access principally being a
matter of policy to be determined by the legislative branch through
the adoption of freedom of information and similar laws), 52 the
49
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) and its
progeny; see also, Raleigh Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access
Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006) (describing the confused state of
this jurisprudence, particularly at the trial court level).
50
See, e.g., Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 418 (6th Cir. 2016)
(citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th
Cir. 1983)); United States v. DeJournett, 817 F.3d 479, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2016);
In re Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Miami
Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d
681 (6th Cir. 2002).
51
See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d
1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Our review of the Supreme Court’s decisions
confirms that the First Amendment does not merely prohibit the government
from enacting laws that censor information, but additionally encompasses the
positive right of public access to information and ideas.”); see also, Anne
Klinefelter, First Amendment Limits on Library Collection Management, 102
LAW LIBRARY J. 343, 344 (2010).
52
See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 222 (2013) (holding that there
is no fundamental right to access public information); Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1978) (“The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act,” and “[n]either the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
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Court has also stated that the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) was “designed to create a broad right of access to official
information.” 53
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been slow to define the
sources and scope of the right to information, particularly with
respect to government held information and the right to gather or
access information as opposed to receive it, 54 it has developed an
important corollary principle of law; namely, the strong public
policy of the U.S. that favors the unfettered collection, use, and
distribution of publicly disclosed information. 55 As was famously
expressed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in International News
Serv. v. Associated Press: “[t]he general rule of law is, that the
noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication
to others, free as the air to common use.” 56 This principle has
found expression in numerous information law cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court since INS. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., for instance, the Court explained: “that which is in the
public domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the
States” and that “all ideas in general circulation [are] dedicated to
the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent.” 57 It
government information or sources of information within the government’s
control.”).
53
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
54
See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 222 (2013) (holding that there
is no fundamental right to access government information).
55
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“the State may not,
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of
available knowledge”). Note: The word “public” is used here to refer to publicly
available information, not as a synonym for government information. A variety
of U.S. laws and case decisions define publicly available information, including
U.S. patent law and its definition of “prior art” and U.S. copyright law and its
definition of the “public domain.”
56
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
57
416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668
(1969) and citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570–571 (1973)); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–238 (1964); Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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is also reflected in cases that involved tort claims related to
published information. 58 Most recently, in a case centered on the
meaning of Exemption 4 of FOIA, the U.S. Supreme Court
reiterated this core principle when it stated that, at a minimum, the
definition of “confidential” under FOIA does not include
information that was freely shared. 59
C. The Need to Balance Fundamental Rights Against Trade Secret
Protection
Although the source and the scope of the right to information
may be inconsistent between the E.U. and U.S., the foregoing
establishes that the right to information (particularly with respect
to government information and information that has been made
public) is an important value both in the U.S. and E.U. This is
buttressed by the fact that while limitations on the right to
information are allowed pursuant to Article 19.3 of the ICCPR,
they must be limited in scope and “necessary” to further specified
purposes. Thus, while the “rights of others” language of Article
19.3 of the ICCPR, and similar U.S. jurisprudence will
undoubtedly be cited by trade secret owners as the reason why
trade secret protection can co-exist with the right to information, a
critical question is how the right to information and the rights of
trade secret owners can be properly balanced, particularly when the
subject trade secrets are of great public interest. In this context, it is
noteworthy that in some instances trade secrets may be in the
possession of governmental agencies, leading to a situation where
freedom of information laws would be applicable to such
information. Accordingly, the Trade Secret Directive in its
preamble explicitly mentions some of the E.U.’s freedom of

58
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (libel,
invasion of privacy); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(public disclosure of private facts); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false
light privacy); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(defamation).
59
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019).
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information laws, which remain applicable notwithstanding
introduction of the Trade Secret Directive. 60
We think that acknowledging and understanding the human
right to information means that the starting point for the analysis
should place the burden on the trade secret owner to establish why
an exception to the right to information applies, not the other way
around as is often the case.
We further submit that a primary purpose behind the
limitations and exceptions of trade secret law are to protect and
preserve the right to information (sometimes referred to as the
“right to know”) and, accordingly, that the interpretation and
application of trade secret law should always balance the value and
benefits of information diffusion, including the right of free
expression in all its forms, against the asserted rights of the trade
secret owner. This approach is consistent with most freedom of
information laws that state a default rule of public access with
respect to information held by governments 61 and with many case
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 11 (“This Directive
should not affect the application of Union or national rules that require the
disclosure of information, including trade secrets, to the public or to public
authorities. Nor should it affect the application of rules that allow public
authorities to collect information for the performance of their duties, or rules
that allow or require any subsequent disclosure by those public authorities of
relevant information to the public. Such rules include, in particular, rules on the
disclosure by the Union’s institutions and bodies or national public authorities of
business- related information they hold pursuant to Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), Regulation (EC)
No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Directive
2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), or pursuant to
other rules on public access to documents or on the transparency obligations of
national public authorities.”).
61
See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); E.U. Charter
of Fundamental Rights art. 42; Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145)
31; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1
(“Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of
the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium,
subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this
paragraph.”).
60
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decisions in the E.U. and U.S. that balance principles of free
expression against demands that certain information be kept
confidential. Often, the starting point of the analysis in these cases
is not the protection of information but the default rule of public
accessibility. 62
IV.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND WHISTLEBLOWING
PRINCIPLES IN THE E.U. AND US
In the following parts of this article, we address two specific
public (or third-party) interests—freedom of expression and
whistleblowing—and discuss how the change in focus we advocate
should be implemented in those contexts. Although often framed
as defenses to information misappropriation claims, including in
cases where trade secret misappropriation is alleged, we believe
that the status of the right to information as a human right requires
that it receive greater and earlier attention. 63 The same approach
can be undertaken in other contexts as well, for instance with
respect to trade secret information that is held by governments, is
needed by government regulators, or is needed as a matter of
public safety.
A. Freedom of Expression and Media Under the ECHR and the
E.U. Charter
Under Article 10 of ECHR: “[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
62
The public access to information under these rules is the default, but the
interpretation and application of these rules is occasionally controversial. Even
though protection of commercial interests, including intellectual property, is an
exception to the default of public access, it sometimes seems that companies
have been given too much power to prevent access to the commercial
information they have submitted to the public authorities in the process of
receiving, for example, marketing authorization to their products. See Emilia
Korkea-aho & Päivi Leino, Who Owns the Information Held by EU Agencies?
Weed Killers, Commercially Sensitive Information and Transparent and
Participatory Governance, 54 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1059, 1092 (2017).
63
See Lydia Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV.
685, 685 (2015) (arguing with respect to fair use in copyright that: “Fair use
should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead be treated as a
defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights.”).
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opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 64 As
has often been stated, freedom of expression forms a cornerstone
of democratic society and enables self-fulfillment of each
individual. 65 Thus, in the E.U., the starting point is that the scope of
this right is broad, as the freedom of expression extends to all
expressions, groups, or individuals and to all media. 66 However,
this right is not without exception in either the E.U. or the U.S. In
fact, the ECtHR has utilized Article 17 of the ECHR, which
prevents abuse of rights, to hold that freedom of expression may
not be used to lead to the destruction of the rights and freedoms of
others as granted by the ECHR. Thus, based on Article 17 some
content has not been protectable through freedom of expression in
the E.U. For example, the ECtHR has made such exclusions in
respect to the content that has promoted racism and Nazi ideology
and incitement to hatred and racial discrimination. This type of
content would violate other fundamental values protectable under
the Convention, namely non-discrimination and social peace, and
therefore this type of expression cannot receive protection in
Europe. 67
The ECHR conception of freedom of expression has three
components: 1) freedom to hold opinions; 2) freedom to receive
information and ideas; and 3) freedom to impart information and
ideas. These components are very much intertwined with each
other. For example, freedom to impart information contains a
possibility to criticize government. 68 Here, one can see the link
between freedom to impart information and hold opinions. Under
the ECHR, freedom of the media is considered to form part of the
This is in accordance with Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
65
See, e.g., Dichand et al. v. Austria, App. No. 29271/95, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2002).
66
BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 36, at 12.
67
See generally COUNCIL OF EUR., Guide on Article 17 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, Prohibition of Abuse of Rights (Aug. 31, 2019),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_17_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4X5-B8DT] [hereinafter “Guide on Article 17”].
68
BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 35, at 13.
64
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freedom of expression, as one can derive from the three
components of freedom of expression together the freedom of the
press and the freedom of the media. 69 In the case law of the ECtHR
the freedom of the media is considered often as a part of the
public’s right to receive information, which further is considered to
form a foundation for any democratic society. There is a vast
amount of case law from the ECtHR considering the freedom of
the media. 70 For instance, it has been highlighted that “the press
plays a pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law.” 71
The freedom of the media in the E.U. is further guaranteed
through protection of journalistic activities. The press is entitled to
serve a function as social watchdogs and may reveal confidential
information even if it has been illegally received. 72 In the case of
Dupuis and Others v. France it was held that even though
journalists had received information due to breach of secrecy, they
were contributing to the important public debate and the press was
serving the watchdog role in a democratic society. 73 However,
when journalists enjoy the protection under Article 10 of the
ECHR they are obliged to follow the ethics of journalism. 74 The
professional press is vital for the quality of public debate due to
these journalistic ethics that generally demand that the press verify
the information it reports and put the discussion in context so that
all relevant perspectives are objectively reflected. 75 Consequently,

69
WOLFGANG BENEDEK & MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET 23 (Council of Europe 2013).
70
Id. at 30–32.
71
Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992); Prager &
Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995).
72
Trine Baumbach, Chilling Effect as a European Court of Human Rights’
Concept in Media Law Cases, 6 BERGEN J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 92, 93–94
(2018). For instance, in the case of Haldimann v. Switzerland, journalists used
hidden cameras in collecting information. Later the material was broadcasted,
but in a manner that the recorded person’s identity was disguised. The Court
found that the method used in collecting and imparting information was
acceptable.
73
Dupuis et al. v. France, App. No. 1914/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 46–47 (2007).
74
BENEDEK & KETTEMANN, supra note 69, at 30–32.
75
Baumbach, supra note 72, at 93.
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information often cannot be published without further investigation
and vetting. 76
The protection of journalistic sources is also an important part
of media freedom in Europe. A fear of a disclosure of an
information source has the potential of creating a chilling effect to
journalistic activities, as media would in the end be deprived from
receiving information on issues of public concern. 77 Relatedly,
whistleblowers are likewise protected under freedom of speech.
The Council of Europe Recommendation on protection of
whistleblowers defines whistleblowers to “mean any person who
reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the public
interest in the context of their work-based relationship, whether it
be in the public or private sector.” 78 The recommendation further
suggests that members establish a framework to protect
whistleblowers against retaliation among others. 79
Despite the foregoing, but similar to the ICCPR provision
quoted above, there are some legitimate reasons to restrict freedom
of expression, and Article 10(2) of the ECHR describes
possibilities for taking legislative measures for such purposes. 80
But in the framework of ICCPR, the freedom to hold opinions is an
absolute right and cannot be limited. 81 However, the ECHR seems
to be different from the ICCPR as the structure of Article 10
A discussion of adherence to journalistic ethics, particularly in First
Amendment cases, is not prevalent in the United States. However, the need to
understand and follow principles of journalistic ethics has long been taught in
journalism schools throughout the U.S. and is a stated policy of many media
outlets in the U.S. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Ethical Journalism: A Handbook of
Values and Practices for the News and Editorial Departments,
https://www.nytimes.com/editorial-standards/ethical-journalism.html
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8ND8-E7KM].
77
Id.
78
COUNCIL OF EUR., Protection of Whistleblowers, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)(7),
1,
6
(Oct.
2014)
http://assembly.coe.int
[https://perma.cc/5RXF-CWCR].
79
Id.
80
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1, 12 (Oct. 2013)
http://assembly.coe.int [https://perma.cc/5RXF-CWCR].
81
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 at 52
(Dec. 19, 1966) (Article 19).
76
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indicates that all aspects of freedom of expression could be subject
to limitations.82 Article 10 of ECHR provides, in relevant part:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary. 83

Thus, freedom of expression may only be limited if the
restriction is one of the legitimate reasons described in the Article
and other requirements are also met.
Related to the focus of this article on trade secrets, one
recognized legitimate purpose is to protect “confidentiality.” 84
However, even though protection of confidentiality is a justified
reason to restrict freedom of expression, if freedom of expression
is limited, the limitation must be “necessary” in a democratic
society. 85 The ECtHR has interpreted this to mean a “pressing
social need.” 86 Therefore, not all confidential information can be
regarded as a justified exception to the freedom of expression. The
objective of the expression has an impact on the analysis as well.
Commercial speech is not given the same value and therefore
European countries generally have more latitude to limit such
speech. 87 For example, it was justified to limit publication of firmrelated confidential information in a trade magazine. 88
Yet, even though the nature of the speech has an impact on the
margin of appreciation of the member states, the ECtHR has
emphasized that work-related speech without a link to the public
See BENEDEK & KETTEMANN, supra note 69, at 27.
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 80.
84
Article 10(2) ECHR.
85
Yildirim v. Turkey, App. No. 3111/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 66–68 (2012).
86
Observer & Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 1991 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
13585/88, ¶ 59.
87
Markt intern Verlag GmbH & Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 1989 Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. No. 10572/83, ¶¶ 33, 36.
88
Id. at ¶ 35.
82
83
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interest is protectable by freedom of expression. 89 In these
situations, authorities need to conduct an appropriate balancing
between employees’ right to freedom of expression against
employer’s business interest, including the potential damage
caused by the speech. 90 And this assessment cannot be based
purely on contractual analysis. 91 This proportionality analysis
requirement on freedom of expression limitations is important
when it comes to employees’ contract-based confidentiality
obligations.
Additionally, under Article 10, the limitations must be
prescribed by law, although in specific cases common law
principles have been accepted as sufficiently clear and precise to
fulfill this requirement. 92 Also, when analyzing the legitimacy of
the restriction, the ECtHR considers whether the restriction is
proportionate to the aim pursued. 93 If it is disproportionate it will
violate freedom of expression under Article 10, but it is
noteworthy, that the allowed limitations are interpreted in a narrow
manner. 94 Thus, under Article 10 of the ECHR, freedom of
expression is the default rule and the derogations are only allowed
when all the criteria are met. No other criteria can qualify for
derogation and the interpretation of a limitation cannot go beyond
the normal language utilized in Article 10(2). 95
Three cases from the ECtHR help to illustrate European law
concerning whistleblowing activity and how freedom of expression
is evaluated and balanced within this context. Even though these
cases do not directly relate to trade secrets, they illustrate the
ECtHR’s balancing between various interests at stake, particularly
the importance of the freedom of speech in a democratic society.
Thus, these cases provide some guidance on how the E.U.’s new
Id. at ¶¶ 26, 33; Herbai v. Hungary, 2019 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 11608/15,
¶¶ 41–43.
90
Herbai v. Hungary at ¶¶ 45–48, 50.
91
Id. at ¶50.
92
See, e.g., The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, 1979 Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 6538/74, ¶¶ 46–53.
93
Id. at ¶ 62.
94
Id. at ¶ 65.
95
BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 36, at 35.
89
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whistleblowing provisions (discussed in more detail in Part V. B.
below) are to be interpreted under the Trade Secret Directive.
In Guja v. Moldova, a civil servant was allowed to reveal
information concerning wrongdoings in the Public Prosecutor’s
Office because it was more important in a democratic society to
receive the information on wrongdoings and have open discussion
on that than to maintain the public’s confidence in the Office. 96
The dismissal of the civil servant was considered to violate
freedom of speech. 97 By way of contrast, in Bathellier v. France, a
head of the human resources department of a state electric
company reported about issues in the company, which he deemed
to be a danger for public security. 98 As a result, he was forced to
retire from the company. 99 The ECtHR considered that the person
who reported the facts was not sufficiently capable of evaluating
the matter, even though he had a high position in the company and
that he exaggerated the situation. 100 The ECtHR also emphasized
that the public disclosure is the last resort after reporting the issues
internally in the company and informing the superiors. In this case,
the person had not even sent a copy of the letter to his company but
only to a representative of public authorities. 101 Thus, the ECtHR
dismissed the application because the applicant had gone beyond
the limit of protected freedom of expression. 102
Similarly, in Heinisch v. Germany, a geriatric nurse reported
poor quality of care in a private nursing home. 103 The
proportionality test was used to weigh the employee’s right to
signal illegal conduct or wrongdoing on the part of his or her
employer against the employer’s right to protection of its
reputation and commercial interests. 104 The ECtHR concluded that
there was a public interest in knowing the information when taking
Guja v. Moldova, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14277/04 ¶ 91.
Id. at ¶ 97.
98
Bathellier v. France, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 49001/07.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 28274/08 ¶ 3.
104
Id. at ¶ 66.
96
97
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into account the vulnerable situation of elderly people and the need
to prevent abuse. 105 However, each employee has a duty of loyalty
and discretion. Therefore, the disclosure should be first made to
their superior or to other competent authorities. 106 Only in cases
when these alternative means are “clearly impracticable” should
the information “as a last resort, be disclosed to the public.” 107
Because the ECtHR found that the nurse had used alternative ways
of disclosing the information to her superiors, the employee was
found to have acted in good faith. 108 The public interest outweighed
the employer’s right to protect its business reputation and the
employee’s dismissal was too severe a sanction, resulting in a
violation of the employee’s freedom of expression. 109
The case law of the ECtHR is also important when interpreting
the relevant Charter provisions, which include Articles 11(1) and
11(2). 110 Article 11 of the Charter is understood to follow the
Article 10 of the ECHR and pursuant to Article 52(3) of the
Charter, the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those
guaranteed by the ECHR. 111
There is some IP-related case law from the CJEU where the
Charter Article on freedom of expression has been applied and
which illuminates the importance of freedom of expression in the
context of IP protection. But these cases also show the requirement
of balancing between different fundamental rights and different
interests. These cases support our assertion that trade secret rights
should be balanced against other rights, most notably the right to
information, freedom of expression, and the related interest to
protect whistleblowing. More particularly, the following copyright
Id. at ¶ 71.
Id. at ¶ 65.
107
Id.
108
Id. at ¶ 72.
109
Id. at ¶ 73.
110
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 80. Article 11(1)
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”); and
Article 11(2) (“The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.”).
111
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C
303), 17–35.
105
106
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cases show the margin of appreciation left for the Member States’
courts in the balancing exercise.
The Deckmyn case is one important demonstration of these
aspects. 112 The case was about interpretation of the parodyexception provided by Article 5(3)(k) of the Information Society
Directive 2001/29. 113 The CJEU understood parody as a way to
express one’s opinion and therefore it was connected to freedom of
expression. 114 Moreover, the CJEU noted that the parody-exception
must be interpreted in a manner which efficiently serves the
purpose of the exception. 115 This meant, among other things, that
the parody-exception must not comply with specific requirements
listed by the national court. 116 The CJEU’s approach in this case
has been understood in a manner that the parody-exception was
interpreted more broadly than the traditional approach to copyright
exceptions that the E.U. would have allowed. 117 Significantly, this
was done in order to ensure compatibility with the requirements on
freedom of expression under Article 11(1) of the Charter. 118 Thus,
in the Deckmyn case the CJEU guided courts to strike a fair
balance between the interests and rights of authors and the freedom
of expression of the user of a protected work who is relying on the
exception for parody. 119 Consequently, there has to be balancing
between protection of intellectual property and freedom of
expression.

Case C‑201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen & Others, EUR-Lex CELEX
62013CJ0201 (Sept. 3, 2014).
113
Id. at ¶ 13.
114
Id. at ¶ 25.
115
Id. at ¶ 27.
116
Id. at ¶¶ 20–25. The CJEU held that, among others, the parody does not
need to display an original character of its own, nor mention the source of a
parodied work. Id. at ¶ 33.
117
Id. at ¶ 24.
118
Christophe Geiger et. al, Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements of
the Legal Framework for Copyright in the European Union – Opinion of the
European Copyright Society on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13
Deckmyn, 46 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93, 97–99 (2015).
119
Case C‑201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen & Others, EUR-Lex CELEX
62013CJ0201 (Sept. 3, 2014).at ¶ 26.
112
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However, in the Deckmyn case the issue was also whether an
author can prevent a user who is relying on the parody-exception
to use the original work in a context where the message conveyed
is discriminatory. 120 From the perspective of fundamental rights
discourse, it is noteworthy that some content is not protectable
under freedom of expression in Europe. 121 As explained earlier,
racial discrimination belongs to non-protectable content. 122
Consequently, in some instances, discriminatory messages could
go beyond what is acceptable in a democratic society and this type
of message cannot benefit from freedom of expression, leading to a
potential situation that it cannot be protected through the parodyexception either. In fact, the CJEU also referred in the case to the
non-discrimination principle under Article 21(1) of the Charter. 123
In the GS Media case, which relates to hyperlinks to
copyrighted material, the CJEU highlighted that the Internet is
important to freedom of expression and information. 124 Hyperlinks
are necessary to internet’s operation and to the exchange of
information and opinions. The CJEU also referred to the balancing
between various fundamental rights under the Information Society
Directive. 125 It was especially stressed by reference to recitals 3 and
31 of the Directive 2001/29 that the fair balance between the
protection of intellectual property rights (authors’ rights) and
freedom of expression (users’ rights) must be maintained in the
electronic environment. 126 What is interesting in this case, is that
freedom of expression was taken into account even without the
Id. at ¶ 12.
See generally Guide on Article 17, supra note 67.
122
Id.
123
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen at ¶¶ 29–30. The CJEU’s approach in the case
has been criticized on the basis that the E.U. has not harmonized moral rights as
part of the copyright regime. Giving power to an author to prevent the use of
his/her work in a parody context that is discriminatory has been understood as a
step towards harmonizing moral rights in the European Union. Geiger et. al,
supra note 73, at 99.
124
Case C-160/15, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy
Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker, EUR-Lex CELEX
62015CA0160 (2016), ¶ 45.
125
Id. at ¶ 31.
126
Id. at ¶ 31.
120
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support of an explicit exception linked to this freedom. Rather, it
was considered applicable due to its relevance to the internet
context more generally. It was linked to the users’ right to access
information, more particularly, to the exchange of information and
opinions. This part of the decision seems to be in line with the
understanding of how the internet can be regulated in a manner
that serves as an infrastructure for freedom of speech. 127 However,
the end result of the GS Media case can be criticized as it created
different kinds of duties for different types of users in the internet
environment, which complicated the evaluation whether
hyperlinking is allowed or not. 128 In fact, in this case the CJEU
modified its approach to hyperlinks and started to apply a more
restrictive approach when compared to its previous case law on
hyperlinks. 129 However, the valuable part of the CJEU’s reasoning
on the importance of the internet to freedom of expression has
been referred to in the CJEU’s subsequent case law. 130
The CJEU has just recently given three decisions on the
balancing between copyright protection and freedom of
expression. 131 In two of these cases, the question was about
interpretation of explicit exceptions under the Information Society
Directive. 132 More particularly, it was asked if national courts could
See discussion about Internet as a freedom of speech architecture, Jack M.
Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427
(2008–2009).
128
See, e.g., Eleanora Rosati, GS Media and its implications for the
construction of the right of communication to the public within EU copyright
architecture, COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1221 (2017).
129
Tuomas Mylly, Proportionality in the CJEU’s Internet Copyright Case
Law: Invasive or Resilient?, 279–82, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND
THE EU DIGITAL ORDER, Kluwer Law International (Ulf Bernitz, Xavier
Groussot, Jaan Paju & Sube de Vries eds., 2020).
130
Case C‑516/17, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, EUR-Lex CELEX
62017CC0516, ¶ 81 (Jan. 10, 2019).
131
Id.; Case C-476/17 Pelham & Others v. Hütter, EUR-Lex CELEX
62017CC0476 (Dec. 12, 2018); Case C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW GmbH v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CC0469 (Oct. 25, 2018).
132
Council Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright
and related rights in the information society [hereinafter “the Information
Society Directive”].
127
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depart from the restrictive interpretation of the exceptions in order
to give full respect to freedom of expression. 133 First, the CJEU
held in all three cases that Member States are not allowed to
implement exceptions beyond those listed in the Information
Society Directive. 134 Second, in two of these cases, the CJEU held
that as a general rule, derogations from the main rule are to be
interpreted narrowly, the main rule being the exclusive rights given
to the rightsholders. The national courts must apply an
interpretation which is consistent with the wording used in the
specific exception and in addition adhere to the strict requirements
of the three-step test under Article 5(5) of the Information Society
Directive which requires: (1) a special case; (2) no conflict with
the normal exploitation of the work; and (3) which does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rightsholder. 135
On the surface, the foregoing means that there is no possibility
for national courts to go beyond what the wording of the copyright
exception and the three-step test enable, even where freedom of
expression concerns would otherwise speak in favor of permitting
the use of the copyrighted work in question. Yet, the CJEU
continued that even though Article 5 provides “exceptions and
limitations,” they give rights to users and the aim of this Article is
to ensure a fair balance between rights and interests of
rightsholders and rights and interests of users of protectable subject
matter. Therefore, a national court must apply an interpretation of
these exceptions in a manner that ensures their effectiveness and
the observance of fundamental rights. The CJEU also highlighted
that even though intellectual property is protected under the
Charter, there is nothing to suggest that it would be an absolute
right. 136
Spiegel Online GmbH, EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CC0516; Funke Medien
NRW GmbH, EUR-Lex CELEX 62017CC0469.
134
Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶¶ 41, 48; Pelham & Others at ¶¶ 58, 64; Funke
Medien NRW GmbH at ¶¶ 56, 63.
135
Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶¶ 37, 53, 59; Funke Medien NRW GmbH at ¶¶
48, 52, 69, 76.
136
Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶¶ 46, 51–56, 59; Funke Medien NRW GmbH at
¶¶ 52, 67–72, 76.
133
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These copyright cases may provide some guidance on how the
freedom of expression exception would be treated under the Trade
Secret Directive, leading to constitutional balancing between
various fundamental rights and interests within the E.U. However,
a balancing requirement is arguably greater under the Trade Secret
Directive due to various provisions that are more direct and
intentional in ensuring freedom of expression and whistleblowing.
For instance, in the Trade Secret Directive, there is an explicit and
generally worded freedom of expression provision that is more
clearly communicated when compared to the situation under the
Information Society Directive, where freedom of expression is
merely to be taken into account when interpreting the particularly
worded exceptions. 137 Further, as indicated above, the
interpretation under the Information Society Directive is curtailed
by a number of factors, as the interpretation must be consistent
with the wording of an explicit exception as well as with the threestep test, even when the specific exception and the situation at
hand are tightly connected to fundamental rights. 138 No such
requirements exist in the Trade Secret Directive. Therefore, it
seems likely that the scope of the freedom of expression provision
under the Trade Secret Directive will be applied more liberally
than under the Information Society Directive, as further discussed
below.
B. Freedom of Expression and Press Under the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution
Freedom of expression is defined in the U.S. by the U.S.
Constitution and the constitutions of each state, as well as by
related federal and state laws. In this article, we focus on the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states, in pertinent part,
that: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people . . . to petition the
Government for redress of grievances.” 139 It is a restriction on the
actions of government (a so-called negative right) that requires
some form of recognized “state action” and, unlike its E.U.
Discussed infra, notes 186–91.
Spiegel Online GmbH at ¶ 59; Funke Medien NRW GmbH at ¶ 76.
139
U.S. Const. amend I.
137
138
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counterpart, is not stated as a positive right. However, although
limited in this manner, the First Amendment has broad reach as it
has been held applicable to many types of government actions,
both at the state and federal level. 140 Thus, free speech and freedom
of the press concerns can arise in the U.S. whenever the
application or enforcement of law risks quelling freedom of
expression.
The required “state action” can take many forms; the most
obvious are the adoption and enforcement of laws or regulations
that restrict speech. Less obvious are court orders. Any court order
or remedy in the U.S., whether issued by a federal or state tribunal
and including the grant of preliminary relief, can constitute a
restriction on freedom of speech or the press, and even if it
involves the enforcement of private covenants. 141 Additionally, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment can be the
basis for a defense in cases where the alleged wrongful behavior
involves speech. 142 Thus, issues related to freedom of speech and
press and the right to petition the government can arise in
information related lawsuits when the activities of the defendant
involve the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and when
the remedies sought would restrain the exercise of those rights. For
example, a First Amendment defense has been successfully
asserted with respect to invasion of privacy claims 143 and trade
secret misappropriation claims. 144 In copyright cases in the U.S.,
the issue is part of the fair use analysis, with the U.S. Supreme
Court noting that U.S. copyright law is saved from First

Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2019) (“That short but
forceful phrase has given rise to a complex array of legal protections for free
expression which the courts have flexibly applied to a variety of
circumstances.”).
141
See Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
142
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988)
(finding that a First Amendment defense could be asserted against an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim).
143
See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.
1989); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986).
144
See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994); Procter & Gamble Co.
v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
140
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Amendment scrutiny due to the existence of the fair use limitation
on copyright protection. 145
Like E.U. law, described above, there are many different
aspects to U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence and the analysis is
highly contextual. From the text of the First Amendment, it is clear
it was designed to preclude government restrictions on those who
wish to speak orally, in print, or through the use of the press. But
the First Amendment has also been interpreted to protect: the rights
of listeners 146 and readers; 147 the ability to distribute literature; 148
the anonymity of speakers; 149 and whistleblowers (discussed in
more detail in Part V). Also, as previously noted, it is the basis for
a right of access to judicial proceedings. 150
A central premise of the First Amendment is that the
dissemination of more information is an essential feature of a
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
146
Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Va. St. Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)
(“[T]he protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients both.”).
147
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men’s minds.”). Contra, United States v. Am. Library Assn.,
Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that Congress can direct federal funds to
direct a policy for libraries to protect against Internet access to pornographic or
obscene materials, as Congress was not regulating private conduct, but
conditioning the receipt of federal funds).
148
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and
leaflets.”).
149
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that
anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure
violated the ‘freedom of the press.’”); see also Victoria Smith Ekstrand &
Cassandra Imfeld Jeyaram, Our Founding Anonymity: Anonymous Speech
During the Constitutional Debate, 28 AM. JOURNALISM 35, 53 (2011) (stating
that anonymous speech is “inextricably linked” to the revolution and founding of
the US).
150
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
145
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democracy, the best cure for undesirable speech, and is necessary
to create a “marketplace of ideas.” The first reference in a U.S.
Supreme Court case to the “free trade in ideas” within “the
competition of the market” appears in Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr.’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 151 but it has since
been adopted by the Supreme Court and restated in numerous
cases. 152 This core principle has been held applicable to many laws,
even those that were aimed at curbing what many deem to be
hateful speech, such as that of the Ku Klux Klan 153 and cross
burning. 154 Thus, this approach is different from the approach
under the ECHR, as under the ECHR regime hate speech would
not be protectable under freedom of speech principles due to the
fact that it conflicts with other stated fundamental rights. 155 But
despite its breadth, the First Amendment is not without limits;
restraints on speech and the press are allowed in some limited
situations which often require courts to consider and balance
competing interests.
Whether restrictions on speech and of the press are allowed
under the First Amendment depends upon a number of factors,
including the category of speech involved (for instance, political,
religious, and commercial) and, consequently, the level of scrutiny
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
152
See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
(citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
153
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (“This Court has made clear, however, that
mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the
protection of the First Amendment.”).
154
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
155
See also Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and
the Limits to Freedom of Expression in the EU: A Comparative Analysis, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 508 (A. Savin & J. Trzaskowski
eds., 2014).
151

MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information

37

that is applied to the challenged government restriction. 156 For
instance, “the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions
directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens
on speech.” 157 This is similar to the European approach discussed
above. However, the type of speech is not all that is considered.
The wording of the challenged laws is also critical, with
restrictions that are content-based being more suspect than those
that are content-neutral. The U.S. Supreme Court recently
explained in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra: “[a]s a general matter, such laws ‘are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.’” 158 Governments can always attempt to justify the
challenged restriction(s), but if the court is required to engage in
“strict scrutiny,” or even “heightened scrutiny,” it is often difficult
for state and federal governments to establish that the regulation or
restriction at issue is necessary and narrowly tailored to serve the
required substantial or compelling state interest.
A related principle of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence
concerns the imposition of so-called “prior restraints,” which are
highly disfavored; 159 a principle which is often invoked in cases
involving anticipated press coverage that will disclose otherwise
confidential information. The Supreme Court explained in New
York Times Co. v. United States: “[a]ny system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption

Victoria L Killion, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11072 THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CATEGORIES OF SPEECH (2019).
157
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). The standard for
defining the constitutionality of an incidental restriction “in the last analysis is
little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298
(1984).
158
138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2226 (2015)).
159
See generally Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
156
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against its constitutional validity.” 160 This rule has been applied to
invalidate restrictions on speech even in cases where the source
illegally or improperly obtained the subject information. In such
cases, the rights of the press and the interests of the public in the
information can override any interest in privacy or secrecy, even if
the information was wrongfully acquired by others. The U.S.
Supreme Court explained:
[T]his Court upheld the press’ right to publish information of great
public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party. In so
doing, this Court focused on the stolen documents’ character and the
consequences of public disclosure, not on the fact that the documents
were stolen. 161

Thus, “publication of truthful information of public concern,”
however the source acquired it, cannot be sanctioned without
giving rise to First Amendment concerns. This approach is similar
to the case law under the ECHR that was previously discussed
where the press was allowed to impart information even though the
subject information was obtained due to a breach of secrecy. 162 But
whether free expression concerns will prevail depends upon the
specific facts of each case, particularly with respect to the
importance of the information to be revealed.
One area of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence that is not as
protective as the E.U. principles governing freedom of expression
concerns the ability of members of the press to protect the
identities of confidential sources through the exercise of what is
known in the U.S. as the “reporter’s privilege.” As previously
discussed above, in Branzburg v. Hayes 163 four members of the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize a reporter’s privilege in a
case where a reporter refused to testify before grand juries
concerning stories he had written about illegal drugs. However,
since that decision in 1972, the reporter’s privilege has been
successfully asserted in numerous state and federal cases in the
160
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (the “Pentagon Papers”
case)).
161
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 515 (2001).
162
See Dupuis & Others v. France, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 1914/02.
163
408 U.S. 665 (1972).

MAR. 2020] Trade Secrets and the Right to Information

39

U.S., in part due to the suggestion of Justice Powell in his
concurrence in Branzburg that a balancing approach is needed, 164
but also because forty-nine U.S. states and the District of Columbia
have adopted state laws (known as shield laws) which recognize a
qualified reporter’s privilege. 165
In the U.S., the First Amendment has been raised in a number
of IP cases, including in trade secret cases. 166 Often, the trade
secret cases involve the rights of the press with respect to the
publication of information of public concern where the defendant
member of the press or media organization had nothing to do with
the initial (allegedly wrongful) acquisition of the information.
Indeed, in the U.S., the Constitutional interest in freedom of the
press is often directly protected by the fact that the defendant did
not have the requisite “knowledge or reason to know” that the
information was a trade secret that had been misappropriated. 167
Thus, as a practical matter, freedom of expression is protected by
the limited definition of “misappropriation” under the UTSA and
DTSA. The harder cases are when the defendant member of the
press (or other third party) either knew about the trade secret
misappropriation at the time of its publication of the information,
or actively encouraged it.
Often the outcome in cases involving the alleged
misappropriation of information by the press is a matter of timing
and remedy sought, particularly where the plaintiff and putative
trade secret owner seeks preliminary relief, a form of prior
164
Id. at 709–10 (“The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its
facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct.”).
165
See Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral,
Legal, and Civic Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573 (2005).
Wyoming remains the only state without legislation or judicial precedent to
protect reporter’s privilege. State-by-State Guide to the Reporters Privilege for
Student Media (Alabama – Illinois), Student Press L. Ctr. (Sept. 15, 2010),
https://splc.org/2010/09/state-by-state-guide-to-the-reporters-privilege-forstudent-media-alabama-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/C2AD-2NJC].
166
See generally, supra notes 44–45.
167
Samuelson, supra note 2, at 786 (referring to U.S. trade secret law’s “rules
on secondary liability”).
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restraint. In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, for instance, Justice Brennan,
sitting as the Circuit Justice, granted an emergency stay of a
preliminary injunction that would have prevented the airing of a
television show concerning the meat processing practices of a meat
packing company, even though CBS was involved in the initial
(and alleged improper) acquisition of the subject information. 168
Justice Brennan explained: “[e]ven where questions of allegedly
urgent national security, or competing constitutional interests, are
concerned, we have imposed this ‘most extraordinary remed[y]’
only where the evil that would result from the reportage is both
great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive
measures.” 169 Similarly, in Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 170 a federal
district court in Michigan rejected Ford’s request for a preliminary
injunction in conjunction with its trade secret misappropriation
claims because the requested order constituted an unjustified prior
restraint.
Similar principles apply to whistleblowers in the U.S. where
their rights to express themselves and petition the government have
both a Constitutional and statutory dimension; Constitutional
because of the First Amendment values of free expression
discussed above and statutory because there are numerous federal
and state statutes that provide varying types and degrees of
protection for different categories of whistleblowers. 171 For
instance, the first federal whistleblower law was adopted by the
U.S. Congress in 1863 in response to substandard supplies
provided to the Union Army during the Civil War, and recent
legislation has sought to strengthen such laws. 172 More recently, the
federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 was enacted to
protect certain federal government employees from retaliation for
disclosing information, under specified conditions, concerning
510 U.S. 1315 (1994).
Id. at 1317 (internal citations omitted).
170
67 F. Supp. 2d. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
171
See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)
(8)–(9), Pub.L. 101–12 as amended.
172
See The False Claims Act of 1863, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33; The
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)–(9),
Pub. L. 112–199.
168
169
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“any violation of any law, rule, or regulation” or “gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 173
The Constitutional origins of whistleblower rights in the U.S. is
often traced to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District
205, which involved the dismissal of a teacher for publicly
criticizing the Board’s handling of previous tax increases. 174 Noting
that public employment did not require employees to give up their
First Amendment rights, but that there may be legitimate reasons
for government employers to curtail such speech, the Court stated
that: “[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.” 175 It then proceeded to outline the
interests that are relevant to the analysis, ultimately holding that
“absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by
him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.” 176 The Supreme Court later explained in San Diego
v. Roe: “[w]ere [public employees] not able to speak on [the
operation of their employers], the community would be deprived of
informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake
is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it
is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.” 177
The ruling in Pickering has never been overruled, but it has
been limited such that it is not as robust as some would like. 178 This
is due, in part, to the state action requirement of the First
Amendment which means that the Pickering doctrine only applies
5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)–(9) (2018).
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
175
Id. at 568.
176
Id. at 574.
177
543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam).
178
See, e.g., J. Michael McGuiness, Whistleblowing and Free Speech:
Garcetti’s Early Progeny and Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public
Employees, 24 TOURO L. REV. 529 (2008).
173
174
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to public employees who are subjected to adverse employment
consequences due to the exercise of their First Amendment rights.
Additionally, it is clear from Pickering and its progeny that not all
speech by public employees is protected by the First Amendment;
the speech must deal with matters of “public concern,” and must be
engaged in by a public employee in his capacity as a citizen. 179 As
the Court noted in the case establishing the latter limitation,
Garcetti v. Ceballos: “the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor
fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to
proceed with a pending case—distinguishes Ceballos’ case from
those in which the First Amendment provides protection against
discipline.” 180
Since Pickering and Garcetti, federal courts have developed
jurisprudence to define matters of public concern and when a
public employee is acting in his capacity as a citizen. 181 For
instance, in Lane v. Franks the Supreme Court explained that:
“[t]he critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at
issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties,
not whether it merely concerns those duties.” 182 Thus, testimony
that was given by a public employee in response to a subpoena in a
criminal corruption trial was held to be protected by the First
Amendment. Additionally, as previously noted, numerous state and
federal whistleblower statutes have been adopted that provide
greater protection for whistleblowers than the U.S. Constitution
requires, including a new law that applies specifically to trade
secrets, as further described in Part V below. However, these laws
often include special limitations or procedural rules related to
information that is deemed to concern issues of national security.
For instance, the federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
does not extend to employees of U.S. agencies that are a part of the
intelligence community, as defined; 183 the more limited
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 421.
181
See Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the
Wake of Garcetti v. Caballos, 25 ABA J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 509 (Spring 2010)
(describing the jurisprudence through 2010).
182
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014).
183
5 USC § 2302(b)(9)(c)(ii) (2018).
179
180
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Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998 184 applies to
those employees.
V.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND WHISTLEBLOWING AS
‘EXCEPTIONS’ FOR TRADE SECRETS IN THE E.U. AND THE US
While the foregoing demonstrates the concerns of the E.U. and
U.S. with respect to the right to information, freedom of
expression, and whistleblowing, how these concerns are
manifested in the respective trade secret laws differ noticeably.
This is due in part to the fact that most E.U.-member states follow
the civil law tradition. Thus, exceptions and limitations to trade
secret protection in the E.U. are written directly into the Trade
Secret Directive, whereas in the U.S. many of the applicable
exceptions and limitations can only be found in ancillary laws and
legal principles. The following sub-parts detail these differences.
A. How E.U. Trade Secret Directive Addresses These
‘Exceptions’
Article 5 of the Trade Secret Directive sets forth four
exceptions for trade secret protection, the following two of which
relate directly to the present discussion:
Member States shall ensure that an application for the measures,
procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive is dismissed
where the alleged acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret was
carried out in any of the following cases:
(a) for exercising the right to freedom of expression and information as
set out in the Charter, including respect for the freedom and pluralism
of the media;
(b) for revealing misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity, provided
that the respondent acted for the purpose of protecting the general
public interest; . . . 185

The preamble to the Trade Secret Directive further clarifies the
meaning of Article 5. It states that: “it is essential that the exercise
of the right to freedom of expression and information which
encompasses media freedom and pluralism, as reflected in Article
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 105 Pub.
L. 272, 112 Stat. 2396, 2414.
185
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Article 5.
184
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11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(‘the Charter’), not be restricted, in particular with regard to
investigative journalism and the protection of journalistic
sources.” 186 Furthermore, preamble 20 provides: “The measures,
procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive should not
restrict whistleblowing activity. Therefore, the protection of trade
secrets should not extend to cases in which disclosure of a trade
secret serves the public interest, insofar as directly relevant
misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity is revealed.” 187
The final wording of the whistleblowing provision is different
to the one proposed by the Commission. In the initial version it
was further required that the disclosure of the trade secret should
be “necessary” for revealing the misconduct. The initial proposal
was interpreted to mean that even though some disclosures would
be in the public interest, they might not always be necessary. 188 The
final wording seems to set a somewhat more lenient requirement
for disclosures. 189 However, when read together with preamble 20,
“insofar as directly relevant misconduct [] is revealed,” the end
result of the interpretation comes very close to the initial wording
of Article 5 (b). 190
Some have been concerned that whistleblowers may still be in
a vulnerable situation because they have the burden of proof that
their disclosure activities are in the public interest. 191 However, it
should be recognized that in accordance with preamble 20, national
authorities are allowed to apply the whistleblower exception also
in cases where “the respondent had every reason to believe in good
faith that his or her conduct satisfied the appropriate criteria set out
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 19.
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 20.
188
Tanya Aplin, A Critical Evaluation of the Proposed EU Trade Secrets
Directive, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 257, 272–73 (2014).
189
See also Vigjilenca Abazi, Trade Secrets and Whistleblower Protection in
the European Union, 1 EUR. PAPERS 1061, 1069 (2016).
190
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at preamble 20. At least in Finland,
when implementing the Trade Secret Directive into national legislation, the
provision has been understood in a manner that trade secrets can be disclosed
only to the extent that is necessary for the purpose of revealing misconduct etc.
Finnish Government Bill 49/2018, p. 93.
191
Abazi, supra note 189, at 1068.
186
187
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in this Directive.” Consequently, it seems that the burden of proof
is not overly heavy, at least if this flexibility is utilized. Moreover,
the personal scope of the applicability is not limited in any way.
Therefore, it is applicable beyond work-related situations and
extends both to private and public sectors.
As previously noted, when analyzing the Trade Secret
Directive and comparing it with the Information Society Directive,
one might be puzzled that freedom of expression is provided as a
direct exception to trade secret protection. Article 5(a) exempts
remedies when acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret
was carried out “for exercising the right to freedom of expression
and information as set out in the Charter, including respect for the
freedom and pluralism of the media.” 192 This is very different from
the exceptions provided in the Information Society Directive for
copyright protection. One could, for example, find a freedom of
expression fundamental right behind the parody exception for
copyright (as the Deckmyn case discussed above illustrates), but
none of the exceptions in the Information Society Directive
implicate fundamental rights as directly as under the Trade Secret
Directive.
The case law of the CJEU on freedom of expression and
copyright suggests that even though some legal provision under
copyright legislation (or trade secret legislation) may be
understood as an exception, it still has to be interpreted in a
manner to give full effect to the rule and which would at the same
fully adhere to the fundamental rights under the Charter,
interpreted in the light of the ECtHR case law. 193 Yet, the most
recent case law from the CJEU in fact limits the room of
interpretation in the copyright context in two important ways, as
already discussed above. Firstly, the interpretation has to be in
compliance with the wording of the specific exception. Secondly,
the Member States need to apply the three-step test in accordance
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Article 5(a).
The question whether trade secrets are intellectual property is outside the
scope of this article. But on the analysis of such question see for example,
Lionel Bently, Trade Secrets: Intellectual property but not property?, in
CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Ruth Howe &
Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013).
192
193
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with Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive when
implementing and interpreting copyright exceptions.
In the Trade Secret Directive, there is no three-step test. 194 The
non-existence of the three-step test means that such an extra
requirement in implementing and interpreting exceptions in the
trade secret context is missing, allowing broader room for the
exceptions. Moreover, Article 5(a) refers directly to the freedom of
expression and information under the Charter. The provision itself
does not have any other defining vocabulary. Rather, the provision
seems to bring the freedom of expression and information
fundamental right as such into the center of the Trade Secret
Directive. This opens up the possibility to give the right to
information in the trade secret context an effect that flows from the
freedom of expression doctrine under the human rights
instruments. The interpretations under the Trade Secret Directive
may therefore develop more freely than what has been possible
under the Information Society Directive.
Consequently, the case law of the ECtHR becomes highly
relevant when analyzing the operation of Article 5(a), even though
the ECHR is not a legislative instrument of the E.U. As explained
earlier, Article 11 of the Charter on freedom of expression is to be
interpreted in compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR. Of
particular importance is the ECtHR’s case law concerning
journalistic activities and the cases where journalists have been
entitled to reveal even confidential information. It is noteworthy
that even the preamble text of the Trade Secret Directive highlights
the importance of investigative journalism.
The cases of the ECtHR concerning whistleblowing are
likewise relevant when interpreting Article 5(b) of the Trade Secret
Directive. Yet, Article 5(b) contains a more explicitly-worded
exception, which sets some contours for implementation and
interpretation. Some of these potential interpretations have been
addressed above. Even though under the Trade Secret Directive
these provisions, freedom of expression and whistleblowing, are
mentioned as exceptions to trade secret protection, one should bear
Such test is not applicable to trade secrets even under the TRIPS
Agreement, the Trade Secret Directive, the DTSA, or the UTSA.
194
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in mind that under the ECHR, confidentiality is one of the
legitimate reasons to limit freedom of expression, but the other
requirements for such limitations discussed above need to be met
too. Most importantly, the limitation must be “necessary in a
democratic society[.]”
The case law of the CJEU on copyrights highlights the need to
seek a fair balance between different interests and between
different fundamental rights, namely between protection of
intellectual property and freedom of expression. Trade secrets are
also protected under the protection of property ownership and
limitations for property protection are also subject to certain rules
under the ECHR. The notion of public interest becomes a decisive
norm when considering what kinds of actions are deemed to be
appropriate in limiting property rights. In some cases, it might be
in the public interest to keep information confidential, and in some
cases it would be more appropriate to disclose the information. For
example, a threat to public health or environment would qualify as
a legitimate reason for whistleblowing and freedom of expression.
Yet the disclosure may only cover trade secrets to the extent that is
necessary to the disclosure of the wrongdoing. 195 Consequently, the
Trade Secret Directive likewise seeks a balance between various
interests and different fundamental rights.
Some have argued that the open manner in which these
exceptions are drafted would provide some flexibility for Members
to design how to implement these provisions. This could
potentially lead to discrepancies between various national level
implementations. 196 However, one should recognize that even
though the Member States are allowed to provide more protection
to trade secrets, the Directive generally specifies only a minimum
harmonization of trade secret protection, and pursuant to Article 5
Member States do not have discretion. Protection must be
implemented as such under Article 1(1) of the Trade Secret
195
This interpretation has been suggested in the Finnish Government Bill
49/2018, p. 61.
196
FABIAN JUNGE, THE NECESSITY OF EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION IN THE
AREA OF TRADE SECRETS 70–71, (Maastricht Fac. L. Eur. Priv. L. Inst. Working
Paper
No.
2016/04,
2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2839693
[https://perma.cc/62R9-UCME].
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Directive. Furthermore, Members are bound to follow the case law
of the ECtHR. Therefore, Members are not allowed to narrow
down these provisions.
Sections (c) and (d) of Article 5 of the Trade Secret Directive
provide specific circumstances when disclosure is allowed under
specific national or Union rules. These provisions seem to
resemble more closely the detailed exception of whistleblowing as
regulated in the U.S. All these exceptions are also connected to
Article 1(2) of the Trade Secret Directive which sets the scope of
protection and defines what is not protectable. Most importantly,
Article 1(2) of the Trade Secret Directive provides “[t]his
Directive shall not affect: (a) the exercise of the right to freedom of
expression and information as set out in the Charter, including
respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media.” 197 This
provision could likewise be interpreted as highlighting the
importance of freedom of expression over the trade secret
protection. 198 Like U.S. trade secret law, the Trade Secret Directive
includes many other rules which are designed to ensure the
dissemination of information and the right to information.
B. Specific Protection for Whistleblowers in the E.U.
The E.U. adopted a Directive for the protection of
whistleblowers (“Whistleblower Directive”) in April 2019. 199 The
objective of the Directive is to give further protection to
whistleblowers to prevent breaches of law which are harmful to the
public interest (Recital 1). The material scope of the Whistleblower
Directive covers among others the following areas of E.U. law:
food and feed safety, transport safety, consumer protection, nuclear
safety, public health, environmental protection, public
Trade Secret Directive, supra note 1, at Article 1(2).
However, another way of understanding this provision is to give it a
“without prejudice” type of meaning. We thank Professor Tanya Aplin for
pointing out the connection between Article 5(a) and 1(2) of the Trade Secret
Directive and potential ways of interpreting the provision. See also, Aplin, supra
note 188, at 272–73.
199
Directive 2019/1937, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law,
2019 O.J. (L 305) 17 [hereinafter “Whistleblower Directive”].
197
198
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procurement, financial services and protection of privacy (Article
2). Thus, even though the Whistleblower Directive covers many
areas of E.U. law, the approach is still sector specific, which is
similar to the U.S. approach albeit in the U.S. there are different
laws for different situations and sectors.
Before the introduction of the Whistleblower Directive, some
urged a need for a horizontal approach. But the E.U. does not have
a power to legislate in all areas of law, which ruled out a horizontal
approach. 200 Moreover, the material scope of the Whistleblower
Directive does not cover all breaches of Union law, but only
breaches in the areas of Union law which are explicitly mentioned
under Article 2. From the recitals of the Whistleblower Directive,
one can learn that areas selected are the ones where breaches may
cause serious harm to public interest and welfare of society. 201
However, E.U. Member States are allowed to extend the
application of the Directive to other areas of law. Moreover, the
Whistleblower Directive does not have an impact on legislation
already at place in the Member States for reporting wrongdoings in
some specific areas of law.
Under Article 21(7) of the Whistleblower Directive, if there is
a need to disclose trade secrets, when reporting or disclosing
information, which falls within the scope of the Whistleblower
Directive, such disclosures are considered to be lawful disclosures
under Article 3(2) of the Trade Secret Directive. Consequently, the
Whistleblower Directive is a lex specialis within the scope of the
Whistleblower Directive. However, these two Directives are
understood as complementing each other and it is clearly
highlighted that when cases do not belong to the scope of the
Whistleblower Directive, the exceptions provided in the Trade
Secret Directive remain applicable (Recital 100); for instance,
freedom of expression exceptions may apply. However, the
introduction of the Whistleblower Directive may have an impact
on interpretations of the Trade Secret Directive. For example, the
Simone White, A Matter of Life & Death: Whistleblowing Legislation in
the EU, EUCRIM (Jan. 22, 2019), https://eucrim.eu/articles/matter-life-deathwhistleblowing-legislation-eu/ [https://perma.cc/4FAM-2S24].
201
See, e.g., Whistleblower Directive, supra note 199, Recitals 3, 5(iii) and
110.
200
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material scope of the Whistleblower Directive can provide some
guidance when analyzing when there is a public interest in
disclosing misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity under the
Trade Secret Directive. But the interpretation of the exceptions in
the Trade Secret Directive should not become more limited, even
though there might be less need to rely on provisions of the Trade
Secret Directive, as the material and the personal scopes of the
Whistleblower Directive are very broad.
The personal scope of the Whistleblower Directive is quite allencompassing. Even though the provision refers to the persons
who learn the information in work-related situations, the
definitions applied also cover job-applicants, trainees, freelancers,
sub-contractors and different type of collaborators who could face
some harmful consequences due to disclosures. In addition, it is
applicable both to public and private sectors (Article 4). Also, in
the Trade Secret Directive the personal scope of the
whistleblowing provision is wide, but it has been reached through
defining the exception to cover the disclosure activity without
making any reference to the personal scope of the exception.
In accordance with the Whistleblower Directive, Member
States are obligated to set up procedures for internal and external
reporting. The Whistleblower Directive clearly refers to and draws
upon the ECtHR’s practice on this issue (Recital 32). Under the
Trade Secret Directive, the recitals only referred to the Charter
provisions, but in the Whistleblower Directive there is a direct
reference also to the ECHR. Moreover, one can see the impact of
the ECtHR’s case law in the structuring of the internal and external
reporting channels. How an entity’s internal reporting channels and
relevant public authorities should be preferred before disclosing
the wrongdoing to the general public seems to stem from the case
law of the ECtHR. This preference is also illustrated in the cases
discussed above. The disclosure to the public should always be the
last resort. However, the Directive also provides some flexibility
for cases when these preferred reporting channels are deemed to be
impractical. In such cases the wrongdoings could be reported
directly to the public.
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Article 15 sets up specific conditions when public disclosures
are allowed. First, one is allowed to disclose information to the
public, if they first have used internal and/or external reporting
channels, but there has been no action taken within the timeframes
set in the Whistleblower Directive. Moreover, one is allowed to
disclose information to the public when one has reasonable
grounds to believe that there is an imminent or manifest danger to
the public interest. Likewise, public disclosure is allowed in cases
of external reporting if one believes that because of the specific
circumstances of the case there is a risk of retaliation or low
prospect of the case being addressed, such as that evidence may be
concealed or destroyed or that an authority is in collusion with the
perpetrator of the breach or involved in the breach. This provision
defines the conditions in a quite detailed manner.
Under the case law of the ECtHR, one is entitled to public
disclosures in cases where alternative ways of disclosure are
considered “clearly impractical.” 202 The requirements under the
Whistleblower Directive seem to be in compliance with this case
law and in any case the requirements need to be interpreted and
implemented in such a manner. These more detailed provisions of
the Whistleblower Directive can also provide some guidance on
interpretations for the Trade Secret Directive.
In addition to the aforementioned rules of priority, there is a
possibility to disclose directly to the press in accordance with the
specific national rules that set up a system protecting freedom of
expression and information. 203 In Recital 46 it is highlighted that
whistleblowers are especially important for investigative
journalism and therefore providing protection for whistleblowers
also facilitates disclosures to the media. 204 This way, the watchdog
role of the media is protected. Article 15(2) of direct disclosure to
the press was not part of the initial proposal for the Whistleblower
Directive, but was included at a very late stage in the legislative
procedure. 205 This addition is laudable as otherwise the
Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 28274/08.
Whistleblower Directive, supra note 199, at Article 15(2).
204
Whistleblower Directive, supra note 199, at Recital 46.
205
This amendment was not even part of Article 13 of the Committee report
tabled for plenary 27, 1st reading/single reading, Report A8-0398/2018
202
203
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Whistleblower Directive would have potentially narrowed media’s
possibilities to receive information and enable public discourse
over important issues, having a clear impact on freedom of
expression. 206 Now the distinction is drawn between disclosure to
general public and disclosure to the press. Disclosure to the public
is the last resort after the order of priority described above is
followed and subject to the specific conditions. But disclosure to
the press can take place without such specific conditions.
In Finland, the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression
in Mass Media (460/2003) provides rules on editorial
responsibility and confidentiality of information sources. It seems
likely that this type of legislation qualifies as specific national rules
mentioned in Article 15(2) of the Whistleblower Directive. As the
press needs to follow their specific rules and journalistic ethics
before publishing some information, the reputation of business
entities is not unduly risked through this information flow. 207 The
confidentiality
of
information
sources
also
protects
whistleblowers. 208 Consequently, disclosure to the press under this
(27.11.2018) on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law
(COM(2018)0218 – C8-0159/2018 – 2018/0106(COD)), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0398_EN.html?redirect
[https://perma.cc/55R3-DCJN]. However, it was included to text, which was
finally adopted by the European Parliament in Article 15.2. P8_TAPROV(2019)0366 Protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law
European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 April 2019 on the proposal for
a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of
persons reporting on breaches of Union law (COM(2018)0218 – C8-0159/2018
– 2018/0106(COD)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-82019-0366_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9VW-7RY5].
206
This line of argumentation was also provided among others by European
Federation of Journalist in their open letter to the European Parliament, where
they requested the type of amendment that was finally adopted in Article 15.2.
Nikola Frank et al., Open Letter to European Institutions: Public Reporting
Must be a Safe Option for Whistleblowers, EUR. FED. JOURNALISTS (Jan. 17,
2019), https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2019/01/17/open-letter-to-europeaninstitutions-public-reporting-must-be-a-safe-option-for-whistleblowers-2/
[https://perma.cc/U8ZC-YRLT].
207
Id.
208
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the
Protection of Whistleblowers, COUNCIL EUR. (Apr. 30, 2014),
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type of national rules can be argued to reach the same objective as
the other detailed priority rules on disclosure under the
Whistleblower Directive. Moreover, this provision ensures that the
Whistleblower Directive respects fully the freedom of expression
and information under the ECHR Article 10. 209 The flexibility
between different reporting channels is also in line with the
Council of Europe’s recommendation on the protection of
whistleblowers. 210
C. How the U.S. has Reconciled Freedom of Expression and
Trade Secret Protection
While some of the interpretations of the U.S. Constitution’s
right of free speech resemble the end results that have been
reached under the ECHR, as elaborated previously in this article,
the possibility of relying on these rules (as well as other ancillary
limiting doctrines) may not be very obvious to the parties to a case.
Unlike the Trade Secret Directive, no provision of the DTSA or the
UTSA specifically mentions freedom of expression as an issue to
be considered in trade secret cases. Nonetheless, as discussed
above, it is clear under U.S. law that where the assertion of trade
secret rights would restrain free speech or freedom of the press, a
First Amendment argument (often framed as a “defense”) may be
asserted. 211 Additionally, both the DTSA and UTSA (as adopted in
each state) may be challenged as unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds, particularly as applied. However, although
information diffusion through free speech and freedom of the
press, particularly on matters of public interest, are important
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Rec(2014)7&Language=lanEnglish&
Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackCo
lorLogged=F5D383 [https://perma.cc/75S4-4S63].
209
Nikola Frank et al., Open Letter to European Institutions: Public Reporting
Must be a Safe Option for Whistleblowers, EUR. FED. JOURNALISTS (Jan. 17,
2019), https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2019/01/17/open-letter-to-europeaninstitutions-public-reporting-must-be-a-safe-option-for-whistleblowers-2/
[https://perma.cc/U8ZC-YRLT].
210
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the
Protection of Whistleblowers, supra note 208.
211
See Ford Motor Company v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d. 745, 752 (E.D. Mich.
1999).
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values in the U.S., whether a First Amendment argument will
succeed in a trade secret misappropriation case depends upon a
number of factors, including the wrongfulness of the defendant’s
behavior and the public importance of the information to be
conveyed.
The most obvious reason why a First Amendment defense does
not always work in trade secret cases in the U.S. is because not all
acts that constitute trade secret misappropriation have a
communicative aspect. Under both the UTSA and the DTSA, trade
secret information may be wrongfully acquired and used without
there ever being any communication of the trade secrets to others,
particularly publicly. For instance, although a competitor may
wrongfully acquire trade secret information, it may only use it
internally and never disclose it outside the confines of its own
business. For this reason, the trade secret cases in the U.S. where a
First Amendment defense has been asserted are rare, and they
usually involve speech by the press on a matter of public concern
in situations where the involved journalist was not involved in the
initial misappropriation of the subject information. 212 It is much
more rare for the person who directly misappropriated alleged
trade secrets to assert a First Amendment defense, but the First
Amendment should be raised whenever the remedy sought would
quell speech, particularly if the information at issue concerns a
matter of great public concern.
When a journalist is more directly involved in the alleged trade
secret misappropriation, then a clearer conflict arises between
freedom of the press and the goals of tort law. As summarized by
Richard Epstein, historically the goals of tort law often prevailed
over First Amendment concerns:
For most of [U.S.] constitutional history it was difficult to detect any
real tension between the common law principle of defamation (and, one
may add, privacy) and the First Amendment. The usual reconciliation
of the two principles was that the law of defamation was concerned
with false speech to the discredit of the plaintiff, which, being
wrongful, received no constitutional protection at all. 213
See Samuelson, supra note 2.
Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The
Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1008
212
213
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But part of the reason is because there are numerous free
speech and free press safety-valves built into U.S. trade secret law
(and IP law more generally) that serve to balance information
protection against the U.S. policy of information diffusion.
Professor Pamela Samuelson identified the following trade secret
principles: (1) reverse engineering; (2) preemption as a check on
trade secret law; (3) accidental disclosure; (4) limits on third party
liability; and (5) trade secret interests may be overridden by other
societal interests. 214 This list can be supplemented by: (6) the
limited definition of a trade secret, including the principle that
general skill and knowledge is not protected and the requirement of
“independent economic value”; (7) the principle of independent
development; (8) the knowledge or reason of know standard of
misappropriation; (9) the role of equitable considerations is the
decision to grant injunctive relief; and (10) the applicable
whistleblower immunity principles and statutes.
As an apparent consequence of the free speech and free press
safety-valves (and other limitations on coverage) that are built into
U.S. trade secret law, a public interest exception to trade secret
protection is not well-developed. It is briefly mentioned in the
commentary to the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, but without much explication. 215 Often, where a
public interest limitation is discussed is with respect to requests for
injunctive relief or protective orders when courts must consider
common law equitable principles and where a rich body of
jurisprudence that considers the public interest exists. 216 Indeed, the
case cited in the UTSA commentary for the proposition that there
(2000) (commenting on U.S. law prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
214
Samuelson, supra note 2, at 782–89.
215
See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, cmt. and Rest. (Third) of Unfair
Competition, § 40, cmt. c.
216
See, e.g., Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 418 P.3d 102 (Wash. 2018) (reversed
and remanded, stating the lower court did not sufficiently weigh the public’s
interest in disclosure); Medspring Grp., Inc. v. Feng, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1270,
1280 (D. Utah 2005) (“This goal [of developing new technologies by
authorizing injunctive protection of trade secrets], however, must be balanced
against the public’s interest in encouraging competition and supporting an
individual’s right to exploit his own skill and knowledge.”).
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is a public interest exception to trade secret law, Republic Aviation
v. Schenk, involved the request for a permanent injunction in a
trade secret case that was brought during the Vietnam War. The
court noted: “In determining the advisability of granting the
plaintiff the sweeping injunctive relief sought in the action, factors
extrinsic of the record must be considered. Those factors are the
interests of the public, the armed services and national security.” 217
As a result of the foregoing, it is not that U.S. courts are not
charged with considering the public interest in trade secret cases.
Rather, what is missing in U.S. law that is explicit in the Trade
Secret Directive is a list of specific (but not necessarily, exclusive)
matters of public interest that should be considered as part of trade
secret litigation in the U.S., including: (1) free speech and freedom
of the press; (2) free competition; (3) employee mobility; (4)
regulatory oversight; (5) the rights of collective organizations
(unions); and (6) personal privacy interests. As a practical matter,
defendants in trade secret cases must raise these issues for them to
be considered, and many courts in the U.S. have been receptive to
these interests when raised. Indeed, as previously noted, some of
these issues have been raised in trade secret cases in the U.S. to
limit the scope (if not deny the grant of) both preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief.
E. Whistleblowing as Specific Exceptions for Trade Secrets in the
U.S.
Given the limited scope of the First Amendment free speech
rights of public employees, as described above, statutory
protections for such employees and other whistleblowers (usually
the employees of public contractors) is important and exists at both
the state and federal level in the U.S. pursuant to various common
law principles, statutes, and regulations. 218 While each
whistleblower law and regulation in the U.S. is different in scope,
focus, and specifics, the general purpose of these laws is to
Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk, 1967 WL 7717, at *7, 152 USPQ 830
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1967).
218
For an overview of the federal laws, see JON O. SHIMABUKURO & L. PAIGE
WHITAKER, CONG. RES. SERV., R42727, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS UNDER
FEDERAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW (2012).
217
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encourage employees of government agencies and government
contractors to provide information about suspected wrongdoing
and illegal behavior, often by specifying the means of disclosure
and providing protection from retaliation. Generally, alleged
wrongdoing is a proper subject for whistleblowing behavior if it:
(1) concerns a financial loss to the government; (2) constitutes a
violation of law, or (3) causes harm to employees or the general
public. However, the disclosure of information alleged to
constitute classified information may subject the person disclosing
the information to prosecution under the federal Espionage Act,
making a decision to engage in whistleblowing particularly
difficult for employees of the intelligence community, as defined.
The applicability of U.S. whistleblowing rules principally to
public employees and employees of public contractors is different
from the European approach, as the European approach makes no
distinction between employees in the public and private sector. For
example, in the case Heinisch v. Germany, explained earlier,
misconduct was taking place in a private enterprise. 219 However,
under U.S. law, there is nothing to prevent private citizens from
reporting government wrongdoing provided their actions in doing
so are not illegal or tortious. 220 Indeed, as noted previously, the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes the right to
petition the government. Additionally, U.S. First Amendment
jurisprudence offers protection to private citizens charged with
defamation if the plaintiffs are public officials, public figures, or
the matters discussed are of public concern 221 and some U.S.
whistleblower statutes apply to private citizens, for example the
whistleblower provisions of the UTSA.
Heinisch v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 28274/08.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (“The right of
free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in
Madison’s view, a fundamental principle of the American form of
government.”) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
570 (1876)); Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 678. (“The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but
information. Political conduct and views which some respectable people
approve, and others condemn, are constantly imputed to Congressmen.”).
221
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 348–49
(1974).
219
220
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More directly, the new DTSA whistleblower provisions create
an immunity for trade secret misappropriation which is applicable
in both civil and criminal cases whether brought in state or federal
court. Known as the “whistleblower defense” or the
“whistleblower immunity,” it is based upon the public’s interest in
learning about illegal behavior. However, the DTSA whistleblower
provision is very specific, as its three parts, which are revealed in
the amended Section 1833 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
The first part of the DTSA whistleblower provision details the
immunity that individuals enjoy under the statute, as follows:
(b) Immunity from liability for confidential disclosure of a trade secret
to the government or in a court filing.
(1) Immunity. An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly
liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a
trade secret that—
(A) is made—
(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official,
either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and
(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected
violation of law; or
(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other
proceeding, if such filing is made under seal. 222

As so worded, it only allows for the information to be disclosed
to specified individuals “in confidence” and, if made in a
document filed in a lawsuit, it must be made “under seal.” 223 The
DTSA does not define what the two quoted terms mean, but the
rules of many federal and state courts specify the procedures for
filing a document under seal.
The second part of the DTSA’s whistleblower provision
concerns disclosures within the context of retaliation lawsuits.
These are often brought by whistleblowers when they are
terminated by their employers for disclosing information to
government officials, often based upon state or federal statutes that
allow such lawsuits. It provides:
(2) USE OF TRADE SECRET INFORMATION IN ANTIRETALIATION LAWSUIT. An individual who files a lawsuit for
222
223

18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1) (2018).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1833(b)(1)(A)(i)–(B) (2018).
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retaliation by an employer for reporting a suspected violation of law
may disclose the trade secret to the attorney of the individual and use
the trade secret information in the court proceeding, if the individual—
(A) files any document containing the trade secret under seal; and
(B) does not disclose the trade secret, except pursuant to court order. 224

As already noted, a separate body of state and federal law,
usually in the form of court rules, defines what it means to file
information “under seal.”
The third part of the DTSA’s whistleblower provision is a
penalty, of sorts, and is of particular import to employers because
it requires that employees be given notice of the whistleblower
immunity. Prior to the adoption of this aspect of the DTSA, some
U.S. whistleblower laws require employers to be give notice to
their employees of whistleblowing rights, but others did not. With
respect to trade secret information, this provision fills those
loopholes and provides that failure to give the required notice will
adversely affect the availability of remedies in trade secret actions
against employees.
While helpful as an explicit limitation on liability for trade
secret misappropriation under U.S. law, the DTSA whistleblowing
provision is limited in scope when compared to the European rules
as it only allows disclosures to government or to the courts in
specified situations and does not cover disclosures to the general
public or to the press. Other legal principles for the protection of
freedom of expression and whistleblowing, where they exist, must
be resorted to in such situations. So, it seems that E.U. rules, both
under the Trade Secret Directive and the Whistleblower Directive,
provide more security and clarity to whistleblowers and
consequently ensure more efficient public access to information.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Although the United States and European Union approach
issues of freedom of expression and whistleblowing differently,
they have a lot to learn from one another. Looking through the lens
of U.S. trade secret law, upon which the Trade Secret Directive is
based, many of the public interest concerns that animated the
224

18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(2) (2018).
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debates that led to the enactment of the Directive can be
ameliorated if E.U. countries properly and fully apply the
limitations on the scope of trade secret rights that are a part of a
prima facie claim of trade secret misappropriation. From an E.U.
perspective, the U.S. could do a much better job of articulating the
sorts of public interest concerns that should limit liability or the
grant of injunctive relief in trade secret cases, perhaps even
amending the UTSA and DTSA to expressly list exceptions to
protection.
In essence, it seems that E.U. rules under the Trade Secret
Directive on freedom of expression and whistleblowing provide
broader and more explicit access to information of public concern
when compared to the situation under U.S. law. First, the
whistleblowing provisions of the Trade Secret and Whistleblower
Directives are not as detailed and restricted as their counterparts in
the United States. Second, the non-existence of an express freedom
of expression provision in U.S. trade secret law may limit the
application of this fundamental right in trade secret cases for the
simple and practical reason that it is not seen as a critical
limitation. In contrast, the E.U. counterpart has an explicit rule
highlighting freedom of expression and information as
fundamental rights in the trade secret context; a rule that is even
stronger than its counterpart under E.U. copyright law.
Additionally, the preamble text of the Directive also refers to the
fundamental rights under the Charter, which further emphasize the
need to balance the right to information, and fundamental rights
more generally, against trade secret protection.
Moreover, when considering the public interest in information,
courts need not make a binary choice to either protect trade secrets
or not. There is a middle ground that courts can utilize to ensure
that disclosed (or shared) information does not result in the waiver
of trade secrecy. In fact, this middle ground is used frequently in
trade secret litigation when courts issue protective orders designed
to limit the use and disclosure of trade secret information in such
contexts and is an explicit part of the Trade Secret Directive. Thus,
for instance, if the circumstances indicate that the public’s interest
in certain information outweighs the trade secret owner’s interests
in secrecy, the subject information might be shared with a few
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individuals, such as government regulators, pursuant to an order
that they keep the information confidential. Government officials
often receive information from individuals and businesses that they
promise to keep confidential. Also, both U.S. and E.U. law allow
for so-called “royalty injunctions” in lieu of injunctive relief that
would preclude the disclosure and use of information. This type of
middle ground approach is also a feature of the whistleblowing
provisions both in the United States and European Union.
This article discussed the significance the freedom of
expression and whistleblowing rules have in enabling the human
right to access information, which is a cornerstone of a democratic
society. The article elaborated their specific role in the human
rights context but also in the trade secret context, notwithstanding
the apparent conflict between the two principles and the trade
secret protection. From the foregoing, one could learn a number of
important factors that emerge for consideration when balancing
freedom of expression and the right to information against trade
secret rights. These include: the nature of the information (in
particular, whether it actually qualifies for trade secret protection);
how the defendant in a trade secret case acquired and plans to use
the information, if at all; and the public’s interest (and by
extension, the interest of the press) in the subject information.
Most importantly under the balancing approach advocated in
this article, one should bear in mind that the starting point should
not be to value trade secrets over freedom of expression, but to
value the human right to information over information lock-down.
The flourishing of individuals, society, and democracy depend
upon it.

